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I. INTRODUCTION
The will contest and the compromise agreements which often result
have long been a part of the general practice of law. Attorneys are usually
familiar with the local law, but often overlook the federal tax problems
arising out of such contests. A thorough understanding of the tax law
affecting all the parties involved can be invaluable to the attorney in the
negotiations leading to the court decree or compromise. By anticipating
the problems he will have an opportunity to shape the tax consequences
in order to obtain the most favorable result for his client.
The importance of tax planning in will contests may become pain-
fully apparent when a settlement is made without regard to the tax effects.
For example, the claimant may find that he received property which con-
* Member of the Florida Bar. Mr. Kemp is associated with the Orlando, Florida firm
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stitutes taxable income when proper planning might have produced a
more desirable result. The attorney will want to know when the amounts
received by the claimant will be subject to income taxes, and how the
nature of the claim will affect the tax result. Conflicts may arise over
whether the estate will be entitled to a deduction as a result of the pay-
ment. In addition to income tax problems it is possible for the settlement
to result in a taxable gift. There will also be important estate tax conse-
quences, and the estate's charitable or marital deduction may be affected.
State law will be important in determining whether the claimant
will have to share the estate tax burden. Some problems are unique to
settlements after the termination of the estate. The statute of limitations
on assessment and claims for refund should be considered along with the
provisions relaxing such limitations. All parties to the contest will be
concerned with the deduction of attorney's fees arising out of the dispute,
and the executor of the estate may face unique tax problems with regard
to his personal liability arising out of his actions in these contests. Also
important is the role state law plays in the application of the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code: when is state law determinative of federal
tax results?
A thorough understanding of the ultimate tax treatment of the settle-
ment will enable the attorney to provide the most desirable result for his
client. This article will discuss these various tax aspects of will contests,
dealing first with the income tax problems and then with the estate tax
problems. It will conclude with an analysis of the problems which ac-
company settlements that occur after the estate is closed, and the proper
treatment of the deduction of attorney's fees.
II. INCOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Application of Section 102
Section 102 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code states the general rule
that gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift,
bequest, or inheritance. Neither the Code nor the Regulations mention
the application of section 102 (a) to will contests or compromises. When
the question of section 102(a)'s application to will settlements was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in Lyeth v. Hoey' the Court apparently took
a broad view of what constitutes a bequest or inheritance. There the Court
held that property received by an heir under a compromise of his claim
is not included in gross income, having been acquired by inheritance. In
Lyeth, the heirs challenged the testamentary capacity of the decedent.
The compromise resulted from the claimant's standing as an heir. The
Court pointed out that state law provides the standing as an heir, or de-
termines the validity of a will. However, in the interest of uniformity
of application of the Code throughout all the states the Court held that
1. 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
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it was a federal question whether the property the claimant received was
acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or inheritance. In Lyeth v. Hoey, if the
taxpayer had continued with the action and had won, the property he
would then have received as a result of the laws of intestate succession
would clearly have been acquired by inheritance. The Court held a settle-
ment in compromise prior to final adjudication in the courts should not
change the character of the property received when payment was based
upon the claimant's status as an heir.
Just as payment to an heir in lieu of an inheritance in Lyeth v. Hoey
was held to be exempt from taxation as property acquired in the devolu-
tion of a decedent's estate, the Board of Tax Appeals, in Charlotte Keller,2
soon held that a claimant standing as a legatee received property which
was not included in gross income. In the Keller case the taxpayer
was not mentioned in the decedent's will, but was named as a residuary
legatee in a prior will. Thus, the taxpayer was not an heir but instead
based her claim upon the fact that she was a legatee under the earlier
will. The court, extending the rule in Lyeth v. Hoey, reasoned that the
property received by the claimant in the compromise was characterized
by the basis of her claim of a legacy, which, if received under the probate
of the earlier will, would have gone to her tax-free.
Lyeth v. Hoey was further extended in United States v. Gavin'
where the claimant received over $206,000 as a compromise of her claim
against the decedent's estate. The right to the share was based upon the
claim of the taxpayer that she was the natural daughter and pretermitted
heiress of the deceased. In contending that the amount received by the
taxpayer was not exempt from income tax as property acquired by in-
heritance, the government argued that the facts did not warrant a finding
that the amount paid the claimant was paid to her as an heir, and further-
more that some of the property she received did not come from the estate.
The court, relying on Lyeth v. Hoey, held that even though the taxpayer
was not an admitted heir and only claimed heirship, it was this status
as a claimed heir which characterized the payment. It also held that the
status was not altered because $100,000 of what the taxpayer received
came from certain heirs out of their own funds and not from estate
sources. Had the claimant successfully established her claim of heirship
and had the other heirs paid her share in advance from their own funds,
this sum would not have been taxable as income to her.
The attorney should realize when considering a contest or compromise
that the Lyeth v. Hoey characterization of property received, according
to the nature of the claim asserted, can also work against the claimant.
For example, in Tree v. United States4 the widow claimed a dower right
in her deceased husband's share of a testamentary trust. Under local law
2. 41 B.T.A. 478 (1940).
3. 159 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1947).
4. 55 F. Supp. 483 (Ct. CI. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 852 (1944).
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the dower right in this case included one-third of the income from the
husband's real estate. A settlement agreement between the widow and
her deceased husband's brother, who succeeded to the trust share, gave
her payments of certain sums outright, plus annual sums for life. Since
the property received was characterized as dower and thus represented
a share of income from the husband's property, it was taxable income to
the widow.
By looking to see what the tax results would have been had the
contest proceeded to judgment in favor of the claimant, the courts treat
the compromise payment in the same way. Thus, if the claimant has more
than one legal principle upon which his claim can be based, tax planning
may play an important part in the determination of which status the tax-
payer will assert when he presents his claim.
Section 102 (b) provides that any income from an inheritance, or
an inheritance of income from property, shall not be excluded from gross
income. Thus, property received under a contest agreement as income
from property will be wholly taxable to the claimant as a gift of income.
It is interesting to note that a settlement which would qualify as tax-
exempt inheritance under section 102 (a) if collected in a lump sum may
be converted in whole or in part to taxable income if the claimant accepts
payment in the form of a series of distributions or an annuity. Even be-
fore the introduction of subchapter J into the Code in 1954, the courts
readily held that such distributions consisted of an inheritance of income
from property when they were in fact paid out of income earned by the
estate's property.5 The inheritance of income area is considered in greater
detail in the discussion of the application of subchapter J in this Article.
An important consideration in determining the taxability of a settle-
ment in a will contest will be the validity of the asserted claim. While
Lyeth v. Hoey indicates that state law does not control in determining
the nature of a settlement, the courts have often indicated that local law
can be an important consideration in determining how the Lyeth v. Hoey
rule should be applied to a particular case. In Grossman v. Campbell,6
for example, when the validity of a 1949 will had been attacked in order
to obtain a settlement on the basis of a later holographic will, the purported
settlement was disregarded. The court questioned whether there was an ac-
tual dispute as to the validity of the 1949 will, out of which a good faith,
valid, and bona fide settlement arose. The court pointed out that under
Texas law the holographic will was invalid and a later codicil, properly
executed, republished the first will. Thus, the attempt by an oral agree-
ment to provide the decedent with only a life estate in certain property
was disregarded by the court. Since the settlement was not bona fide, the
property was included in the decedent's estate as property held at death
5. E.g., Harte v. United States, 252 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1958); Pauline S. Nalle, 29 P-H
TAx CT. MEm. 241 (1960).
6. 368 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1966).
1968]
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rather than a mere life interest which the agreement purported to give
him. In Bailey v. Ratterre7 the court rejected the contention that property
transferred as a result of an agreement was a transfer of a part of the
estate in a manner so as to constitute an inheritance, pointing out that
no step was taken to vacate the probate of the will. The court noted that
there was no evidence that the estate was released from further claims
and that the evidence pointed to nothing more than a mere arrangement
between the parties. It was also shown that any rights the claimant had to
contest the will had already expired. While the court did not elaborate
upon this point, it seems to illustrate some concern with the right to con-
test under local law. This is an indication that the compromise of a will
contest must be based upon more than a naked threat if the rule of Lyeth
v. Hoey is to apply. A desire to avoid family friction may well prompt a
settlement, but to recognize such a desire as a basis for a contest com-
promise could open the door to tax evasion.
In Lyeth v. Hoey there was concededly a valid compromise agree-
ment, and the Supreme Court, as other courts in later cases, seemed to
have placed emphasis upon the fact that the compromise agreement was
made a part of the probate proceeding.' Other courts, however, have indi-
cated that such incorporation is of itself not determinative and that each
case must be decided upon its own facts.
It seems clear that, in order to obtain section 102 (a) treatment of
property received in settlement of a will contest, the claimant must have a
valid claim under local law. Lyeth v. Hoey will not operate to protect the
settlement from income taxation if state law does not provide the claimant
with the proper status to contest. The courts will look for a bona fide com-
promise as opposed to what is actually a voluntary rearrangement of prop-
erty between the parties. Moreover, the claim must not be one which, if
successfully pressed, would result in taxable income to the claimant. If it
is, then section 102 (a) will not provide tax-free treatment.
B. Disguised Claims for Compensation
The importance of the true nature of a claim leading to a payment
in compromise is illustrated in the many cases which deal with legacies,
or promised legacies, which are actually disguised claims for compensa-
tion.' It is well established law that claims for legacies promised in
return for personal services rendered will result in taxable income. If pay-
ment had been made prior to death and would have been taxable compen-
sation, there is no reasonable way to interpret the Lyeth v. Hoey rule so
that such income would be converted into a tax-free distribution. It seems
7. 144 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1957).
8. See, e.g., United States, . Gavin, 159 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1947); Dumont v. Commis-
sioner, 150 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 145).
9. See, Commercial Nat'l Bank v. United States, 196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952); In re
Sages Estate, 122 F.2d 480 ( d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1941).
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that the characterization requirements of this rule would clearly necessi-
tate looking into the true nature of the claim, and this is exactly what the
courts insist upon."0 In Cohen v. United States" the taxpayer claimed that
his brother promised to leave him certain stock. He received some stock in
settlement of the claim, and he relied upon Lyeth v. Hoey and his status
as a promised legatee in an attempt to enjoy the section 102 (a) exclusion.
The court held that mere payment in the nature of a testamentary disposi-
tion is not controlling and that the nature of the claim would determine
the tax liability. The court found that the claimant's true status, which
commanded the settlement, was as a party to a contract for services rather
than as a claimed legatee.
A similar result was reached in the Tax Court when a claimant filed
application to admit to probate an unsigned copy of a will alleged to be
the decedent's last will and testament." One provision in this will gave the
claimant $5,000. He later filed a claim against the estate for compensation
for personal services prior to the decedent's death. The court held that the
payment which resulted was actually a settlement of the claim for services
rather than the will suit. The court noted the manner in which the amount
of cash to be paid was computed, reasoning that it was the service claim
which commanded the compromise.
Since the amount received in a compromise agreement takes the same
character as the claim compromised, the taxpayer will be deemed to have
received taxable income when his claim is based upon compensation for
services. He will not be permitted to twist the facts in order to obtain the
benefit of the Lyeth v. Hoey rule.
C. Promised Legacies
While the treatment of a claim for compensation is well settled, there
is still a question as to the treatment of one who claims under a promise
of a legacy which was not made. The cases which have considered this
point all seem to have decided that the claimant was actually receiving
compensation. Only by inference have the courts provided any indication
of the result when the promise actually was not a payment for services.
The Tax Court has discussed this issue. In Hugh Coyne"1 the court was
presented with the factual question of whether the property received as a
result of a contest was a result of a compromise based upon a contract to
make a bequest or a contract to pay for services. In holding that the con-
tract for services would not be excluded from gross income the court
seemed to hint that a compromise based upon a contract to make a be-
quest would be excluded. While the court did not specifically say so, it did
imply that a contract to make a bequest would come within the exclusion
10. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
11. 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
12. Wilbur D. Jones, 27 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 822-952 (1938).
13. 22 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1229-1383 (1953).
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provisions. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to decide the case
by a determination of the facts if the result would have been the same
regardless of the type contract involved. Even so, to stretch Lyeth v.
Hoey to cover a claim of a mere promise which was not kept, without the
benefit of standing as an heir or legatee, might require what a court would
feel is an unreasonable extension of the general rule.
A somewhat related question involves a claim that asserts that the
property had been given to the claimant before decedent's death. In
White v. Thomas,14 the taxpayer sued to recover a ranch which he claimed
the decedent had given him before death. He received a cash settlement
in return for a release of all claims on the ranch. The taxpayer cited Lyeth
v. Hoey to show that what he received had the same character for tax
purposes as the claim which was compromised, in this case a tax-free gift.
The court agreed that his assertion was correct, in that what a claimant
receives by compromise is a part of the very thing being claimed. If the
taxpayer claiming the ranch as a gift had received a part of it, the land
received would stand as a gift. Since he accepted money, however, he was
considered as having sold the right which he claimed in the land. Since he
had no cost in the claim, he thus had a zero basis and the amount he re-
ceived was all gain taxable as income. This may at first seem a bit unfair,
since had he received the land as a gift he would have been entitled to a
section 1015 basis in the property which could be recovered without tax
when he later sold the property. Here, however, he did not sell the land
itself since he had neither title nor possession. The court seemed to grasp
this bit of formalism to say that if he had received a distribution in kind
of what he claimed, it would have been received tax-free, but instead he
converted the claim into cash. In short, it seems he must actually receive
a portion of what is claimed. Thus, it appears that where the claimant con-
tends he is due a legacy of cash or a portion of the residuary estate, the
requirement in White v. Thomas should be satisfied by a distribution of
cash (or a distribution in kind from the residuary estate if such is the
claim). Such a distribution would have the same characterization as the
property claimed.
D. The Role of State Law
The relevance of state law in the determination of the claimant's
status as an heir or legatee has been discussed previously. The significance
of state law in determining the federal tax consequences of a particular
transaction has not changed noticeably since Lyeth v. Hoey. However,
the weight which is given to state court decisions, in determining what the
state law is, has now greatly diminished. The new rule which was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner v. Bosch 5 states that
the courts need only to give "proper regard" to a lower state court ruling,
14. 116 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 581 (1941).
15. 387 U.S. 456 (1966).
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even when that ruling arises out of a genuine adversary proceeding. Prior
to the Bosch case the "genuine adversary proceeding" test as set forth in
sections 20.2053-1(b)(2) and 20.2056(e)-2(d)(2) of the Regulations
was generally regarded as the law. The Bosch test does not ignore local
law but permits the federal court to take its own look at the state law. The
courts may decide that the state court decision should not control when
it appears to be based upon a mistake of law, as in Bosch, or a mistake of
fact, as in Lakewood Plantation, Inc. v. United States.'8 Thus, even when
a claim is not compromised but is actually litigated, the state court deci-
sion adjudicating the property rights or characterizing the property in-
terests of a claimant may not be determinative of his status as a claimant
if the federal court finds that a mistake of law or fact prompted an in-
correct result.'
E. The Application of Subchapter J
When the claimant receives property as an heir, legatee or devisee
under the Lyeth v. Hoey rule, it would appear (for the purposes of sub-
chapter J) that he would become a beneficiary as defined in section
643(c). a1 If this is so, the operation of the distribution net income
(D.N.I.), the distribution deduction, and availability of section 642 (h)
carryovers should be recognized by the parties in negotiating the form of
settlement. There is little case law which specifically states that a recipi-
ent, under the Lyeth v. Hoey rule, occupies from the date of decedent's
death the same status as a beneficiary named in the will. There appears to
be no reason why he should be placed in a different position from any
other beneficiary, and the courts do this without comment. The idea that
claimant's right to the property received under a compromise relates back
to the date of death was expressed in Hale v. Anglim.' 9 There the taxpayer
was taxed on the income she received. This income arose from property,
held by the estate, which she later obtained in a compromise agreement.
The court pointed out that her right to the property did not arise at the
time of settlement, but upon the death of the decedent.
F. Distributable Net Income
Distributable net income, or D.N.I., is defined in section 643 (a) as
the taxable income of a trust or estate, with certain modifications. It is
used as a measuring rod to determine the amount and character of any
income upon which the beneficiary is taxed. The operation of D.N.I.
16. 272 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.C. 1967).
17. See Kendrick, Binding Effect of State Court Judgment on Federal Tax Cases, 21
S.W. L.J. 540 (1967) and Fried, External Pressures on Internal Revenue: The Effect of State
Court Adjudications in Tax Litigation, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 647 (1967).
18. See generally, Lewis, Federal Income Taxation of Estate and Trusts, 43 DENVER L.J
183 (1960).
19. 140 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1944).
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within the tier structure of section 662 can require the recipients of both
current income and corpus to share in the payment of income taxes upon
all or a portion of their distribution." Section 662 (a) provides for the
inclusion in the gross income of the beneficiary of all amounts required to
be distributed currently (first tier), and all other amounts properly paid,
credited, or required to be distributed (second tier), subject to D.N.I.
limitations. This may often be difficult for the beneficiary to understand
since he claimed a portion of the corpus of the estate. When he receives
property, other than money, he may feel he is being improperly forced to
bear a portion of the tax which should fall upon those who received the
income which was produced. This result would require the tracing of
assets, which is one of the reasons for the adoption of the tier structure.
If the claimant does not receive the property by a specific bequest, the
distribution of the property will attract a ratable portion of the D.N.I.
which is available for the second tier. In the absence of a specific bequest
on which the beneficiary bases his claim the parties can sometimes mini-
mize the effect of section 662 by careful planning.
The apparently inequitable allocation of income to distributions
made from the corpus of the estate becomes even more pronounced when
the claimant (or any other beneficiary) receives his share in a year when
no other distribution is made. If all the legatees receive their share of
property in the same year they will each bear a proportion of the income
as provided by their respective positions in respect to the tier structure.
For example, if there are four legatees who are to receive $200 each, all
within the second tier, and the estate has income and D.N.I. of $100, each
would include $25 in his gross income if all the distributions were made
in the same year. If on the other hand, only one of the four was to receive
his share in this year he would be forced to include $100 in his gross in-
come since the D.N.I. for that year is allocated to him alone.
Since the year in which the claimant receives his distribution could
well affect the amount which is received tax-free under section 102 (a),
this could become an important bargaining element. This might be espe-
cially so when the claimant is seeking income producing property which,
if distributed to him one year, would reduce estate income which would
be attributable to the distribution of the remaining property to the other
beneficiaries in the following year. The claimant might be able to com-
mand a larger settlement in these circumstances. On the other hand, he
might want to insist that the settlement agreement require that the exe-
cutor also make other distributions within the same year so as to spread
the impact of the D.N.I. The withholding of all distributions to the leg-
atees until they can be paid in the same year will usually produce a more
reasonable allocation of income among the recipients and could have the
advantage of producing less overall tax in the year of receipt due to the
20. The exclusion provided by § 663(a) (1) is discussed later. All citations to sections
in this article are to sections of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
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splitting of income among a larger group of taxpayers. There appears to
be room for a great deal of maneuvering in this area, and if the estate has
a large amount of income the tax results can be significantly affected.
The tax treatment as illustrated above seems to have little justifica-
tion when the interests of all the beneficiaries are considered as a whole,
and the Code provides a separate share rule for trusts which will often
alleviate the problem.2 It is important to note, however, that the separate
share rule is applicable only to trusts, and no provisions are available
which will afford similar treatment to an estate.
G. Distributions outside Subchapter J
The problems in dealing with the tier structure will be avoided if the
property being distributed is excluded from the operation of sections 661
and 662. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a
widow's dower interest is deemed to pass outside subchapter J. 22 Thus
the basis upon which a widow's claim is founded should be carefully con-
sidered when the existence of D.N.I. would otherwise taint the distribu-
tion. Section 102 (a) of the Code excludes from gross income the value
of property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, and section 663 (a) (1)
and the regulations thereunder offer a more specific interpretation of what
constitutes a section 102 (a) gift or bequest for the application of sub-
chapter J. Section 663 (a) (1) provides that property qualifying as a spe-
cific bequest or gift of money or property, paid in not more than three
installments, shall pass outside the provisions of sections 661 and 662, and
therefore pass without any allocation of D.N.I. Thus the beneficiary is
not deemed to receive income on the distribution of the specific bequest in
this situation. The section 663 (a) (1) specific bequest exclusion assures
tax free treatment to qualified property, and, in effect, reinstates tracing
with respect to the identification of the property. Property which fails to
qualify as a specific bequest will pass as a section 102 (b) distribution to
the extent of the D.N.I. allocated by the tier structure.
It is important to note that the language of section 663 (a) (1) refers
to property passing under the terms of the governing instrument. It be-
comes quickly apparent that a claimant who relies upon the laws of intes-
tate succession will not be afforded the benefit of this section, since Lyeth
v. Hoey says he is deemed to take by intestacy and not under the will.
The taxpayer who claims under a will must still meet the additional
requirements of the Regulations in order to obtain the specific bequest
benefits of section 663 (a) (1). In addition to the requirement that the
property be credited under the will, the Regulations in section 1.663 (a)-
1 (b) provide that to constitute "specific property," the amount of money
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 663(c). If the rights of the beneficiaries are sufficiently
identified and separate, then for purposes of the D.N.I. limitation, D.N.I. is computed sepa-
rately for each share.
22. 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 77.
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or identity of the specific property must be ascertainable under the terms
of the testator's will as of the date of his death. The very fact that the
property was acquired under a dispute or threat of a will contest would
seem to indicate that the terms of the will were not sufficiently specific to
qualify such property. It could be argued, however, that under Lyeth v.
Hoey the compromise agreement after death either stands in the place of
or becomes part of the will and relates back to the date of death. There
is some support for this contention in other areas, which are discussed
later in this article.
Section 1.1014(a) (2) of the Regulations states that, with relation to
determining basis, all titles to property acquired by bequest, devise or in-
heritance relate back to the death of the decedent, even though the inter-
est of the person taking title at the death of the decedent was legal,
equitable, vested, contingent, general, specific, residual, conditional, exe-
cutory or otherwise. The Treasury, in Revenue Ruling 55-122,2 ruled
that where charities contested the probated will as legatees under a prior
will, the settlement agreement took the place of the will for the purpose
of determining the charitable deduction allowed under the 1939 Code.
However, since the settlement agreement merely provided for gifts of
income to charity, it held that the charities were pecuniary legatees. Thus,
any money received by them would not be allowed as a charitable deduc-
tion under what is now section 642 (c), because it was not received in
satisfaction of a claim for income. This ruling was revoked by Revenue
Ruling 59-15,24 which held that such a distribution would qualify as a
charitable deduction. However, the revocation by the later ruling did not
affect the Treasury's recognition of the relation back principle. Therefore,
the compromise agreement would still be considered to take the place of
the will, and the claimants would take as legatees.
Even if the agreement relates back to the will sufficiently to qualify
under the date of death test, there is still another obstacle to avoid. Trea-
sury Regulations, section 1.663 (a) (1) (b), state that a bequest from the
residuary estate cannot be considered a bequest of a sum of money or
specific property within the meaning of section 663. Therefore, if the
claim is one that would result in a share of the residue, if the claimant
were to proceed to judgment, what is received in compromise will not
be considered a specific bequest for the purposes of section 663 (a) (1).
The claimant will not be able to benefit by the fact that the discus-
sion of income did not enter into the negotiations. In the Tax Court case
of Eugene C. Delmar,25 the taxpayer argued that he claimed and negoti-
ated for an inheritance which would be excluded from income. The court
held that his lack of knowledge that the estate credited him with the
receipt of his portion of the income for its tax purposes was no defense,
23. 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 390.
24. 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 164.
25. Eugene C. Delmar, 25 T.C. 1015 (1956).
FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF WILL CONTESTS
and that whether he ever specifically claimed this amount had no bearing
on the case. In this instance the estate took the income tax consequences
into consideration in agreeing to the settlement, even though the agree-
ment said nothing about the estate income. The failure of the claimant to
consider the full impact of the tax law resulted in a settlement of an
amount less than he might otherwise have accepted if the additional
taxes had been anticipated.
H. Annuity Payments
Questions may still arise as to whether payments received in a com-
promise are to be treated as an inheritance, under section 102 (a) and
(b), when the claimant accepts annuity type payments. When the distri-
bution of income is from the decedent's estate the question of whether it
will be taxed to the estate or the claimant-beneficiary apparently will de-
pend upon the rules of subchapter J. Prior to 1954, cases held that an
annuity was received as an inheritance, and, if payable out of income or
corpus, the payments were not taxable to the beneficiary nor deductible
by the estate." Now, subchapter J shifts the burden to the beneficiary in
such situations.
2 7
The tax consequences are not always so clear when a settlement is
received from someone other than the estate. The case of Lydia Hopkins
28
illustrates some problems in this area. There the issue was whether the
payments she received constituted an inheritance of income. In a com-
promise agreement the taxpayer transferred her claim to the other bene-
ficiary in exchange for lifetime payments from a trust funded with assets
which did not come from the estate. The court said that she acquired
neither property from the estate nor income from property of the estate.
In so holding they said that the fair market value of the rights relinquished
by the taxpayer was equal to the present value of the annuity received;
thus there was a fair exchange, and no income was to be received until
her cost basis in the value of the rights relinquished was exhausted.
A similar question was presented in Rosen v. United States.29 There
the widow of the decedent exchanged her dower interest in the lands of
the deceased (the interest having a fair market value of over $32,000 at
the date of death) for an annuity of $375 per month for life. The court
concluded that the amounts received each year were not taxable as ordi-
nary income but as payment of an annuity, and that she should be taxed
under the Code sections for computation of income tax on annuities. How-
ever, the case did not mention whether the payments involved came from
a trust or were merely periodic payments received from the other
beneficiaries.
26. Benfield v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 56 (Ct. C1. 1939).
27. See Harte v. United States, 252 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1958) ; James F. Edwards, 37 T.C.
1107 (1962); Dartney Williams, 36 T.C. 195 (1961).
28. 13 T.C. 952 (1949).
29. 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9587 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
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Several cases have held that where the claimant accepts an annuity
from the estate or trust in settlement of his claim, he does not thereby
purchase an annuity which falls within the operation of section 72.0 The
cases which seem to give the claimant a basis in his claim and afford him
the benefit of the exclusion ratio in section 72(b) seem to conflict with
the last sentence of section 662 (a) (1), which deals with annuity type
payments. The Regulations in section 1.662(a)-2(c) in discussing this
sentence point out that an annuity required to be paid in all events (either
out of income or corpus) would qualify as income required to be dis-
tributed currently within the first tier to the extent that there is income
which is not paid, credited, or required to be distributed to other bene-
ficiaries for the taxable year. It therefore appears that if the full amount
of the annuity is paid out of income of a trust, section 662 (a) (1) will
override the annuity provision of section 72, and the payments received
by the claimant will be fully taxed. This would enable the courts to
avoid the conceptual problem presented by the Hopkins and Rosen as-
signment of a basis to claims, which makes available the use of section 72.
(Recall that in non-annuity situations such as White v. Thomas, discussed
earlier, the claimant was held to have no basis in his claim even though
a section 1014 basis would have been applicable if he had received the
property claimed instead of cash.) On the other hand, when dealing with
divorce settlements the Service has ruled that there is no gain or loss to
the wife upon receipt of property as consideration for the discharge of her
dower rights, and her basis in the property is its fair market value.31
If the agreement does not provide for payments from a trust (there-
fore subchapter J has no application) it is still possible that Hopkins and
Rosen may be applied. If, for example, the beneficiaries made the pay-
ments from their own assets, in the manner of a private annuity, it could
then be argued the annuity provisions should apply, as demonstrated by
Hopkins and Rosen. As yet, however, the law does not appear to be suffi-
ciently developed in this area to afford a reasonable degree of certainty;
thus, the claimant in such a situation must consider the possibility that
litigation would result from his attempt to exclude these payments from
income.
I. The Estate's Distribution Deduction
The status upon which the claim is based may affect the estate's dis-
tribution deduction in computing its income taxes. 2 The estate is entitled
to deduct the amount (up to D.N.I. for the year) of income for the tax-
able year which is required to be distributed currently and other amounts
properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed for the taxable year.
Therefore, if the claimant qualifies as a beneficiary under section 643 (c),
30. E.g., Dartney Williams, 36 T.C. 195 (1961).
31. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 63.
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 661.
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a distribution which includes a portion of the estate's D.N.I. for the year
will provide the estate with a corresponding deduction. The special ex-
clusion provisions, such as section 663 (a) (1), discussed previously, will
also be applied here to deny the estate a deduction for any portion of such
distribution. This makes it important for not only the claimant but also
the estate to pay close attention to the type of claim presented and the
grounds upon which it is based. The availability of this deduction may
provide additional leverage in the negotiation of a settlement and should
not be overlooked. 11
J. Section 642(h) Application
Prior to 1954 any excess estate deductions in the year of termination
were wasted since an estate is a taxable entity and the beneficiaries are
not the taxpayers who incurred and paid the expenses. Section 642 (h)
provides a remedy for this situation in the year of termination of the
estate. Under this provision the unused net operating loss carryovers,
capital loss carryovers, and excess deductions in the last taxable year of
the estate are allowed to the beneficiaries succeeding to the property. The
Treasury Regulations in section 1.642(h)-3 define the phrase, "bene-
ficiaries succeeding to the property of the estate," as those beneficiaries,
upon termination of the estate, who bear the burden of any loss for which
a carryover is allowed or of any excess of deductions over gross income
for which a deduction is allowed under section 642 (h). With reference to
an intestate estate, it means the heirs and next of kin to whom the estate
is distributed. In the case of a testate estate, it normally means the resi-
duary beneficiaries and not specific legatees or devisees. Also excluded are
recipients of dower and income beneficiaries. The application of Lyeth v.
Hoey to the claim to determine the character of the settlement will prob-
ably also determine the eligibility of the taxpayer to the section 642 (h)
carryover. If he can otherwise qualify as a beneficiary as defined in the
Regulations, there is no reason why the taxpayer should be denied the
benefit of this section merely because he takes as a claimant.
K. The Claimant's Basis in the Property Received
Generally, the basis of property acquired by bequest, devise, or in-
heritance will be the fair market value at the date of the decedent's death,
as provided by section 1014. The estate tax value of an asset is not bind-
ing for the purpose of computing basis, but there is a presumption that the
estate tax value is correct, and convincing evidence will be required to
prove that a different value is appropriate." The Treasury Regulations in
section 1.661(a)-2 (f) (3) point out the effect of subchapter J upon the
basis of the property received. To the extent that the value of property
distributed in kind is included in the gross income through the operation
33. Rev. Rul. 54-97, 1954-1 Cum. BuuL. 113.
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of subchapter J, the basis to the beneficiary is the fair market value at the
time of distribution. This income to the beneficiary as a result of D.N.I.
will give him a basis in the property determined in part by section 1014
(fair market value at date of death) and in part by the fair market value
at date of distribution. The Commissioner has supplied Revenue Ruling
64-31411 to aid in the determination of basis adjustments required upon
distribution of property in kind.
The application of the above basis provisions should be viewed in
light of certain distributions which are likely to arise in the settlement of
a will contest. In the case of Sherman Ewinge the decedent's will gave
$300,000 in legacies to certain beneficiaries. The executor transferred
both cash and securities in satisfaction of the legacy to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer later sold some of the securities which had depreciated from
the date of distribution value but were still worth more than their date of
death value. The legacy here was general and not a specific bequest of
property, and the court held that since the securities themselves were not
acquired by inheritance or bequest, their basis to the taxpayer should be
cost (here the fair market value on the date of distribution). The result
is as if he received money from the estate which he used to purchase the
stock."6 While the Ewing case did not involve a will contest it could apply
to a claim based upon a legacy.
Often the amount of the taxpayer's claim or the value of the ulti-
mate settlement will determine the basis of the property received. For
example, in Wilson v. Tomlinson37 the basis of stock acquired by the tax-
payer in a compromise settlement of her rights in her husband's estate,
which she accepted in lieu of cash, was the value set up in the compro-
mise agreement and not the lower value of the stock at the husband's
death. Since the claimant had a right to receive cash, it was deemed to be
an acquisition by purchase for the amount agreed upon.
The nature of the claim presented can obviously play an important
part in determining the claimant's basis in the property. A distribution of
a specific bequest will, of course, give the claimant a section 1014 date
of death value. On the other hand, a claim for a dollar amount which is
satisfied by a distribution in kind will give the claimant a cost basis in the
property. Obviously, if there has been no significant appreciation or de-
preciation in the value of the property since the decedent's death, the
question of basis will not be important. However, any time a distribution
in kind is considered to satisfy a claim, this problem should be given some
thought, especially if the claimant is considering a taxable disposition of
the property in the foreseeable future.
34. 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 167.
35. 40 B.T.A. 912 (1939).
36 See also Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 Cum. BuLL. 194.
37. 306 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1962).
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L. Other Income Tax Considerations Important to the Claimant and to
the Estate
As a general rule, the mere distribution of property by the estate does
not result in the recognition of gain or loss. However, some transactions
between the estate and the claimant may require recognition of gain to
the estate. This will not affect the claimant directly, but when negotiating a
compromise the executor must consider the total effect of the settlement.
If the transaction agreed upon is one which will create additional taxes to
be paid from the remaining estate assets, the executor must consider this
as part of the cost of settlement, since it further reduces the amount which
remains for distribution to the other beneficiaries. Thus, another element
enters into the give and take at the negotiating table.
Perhaps the most common type of transaction which creates gain
taxable to the estate is illustrated by Kenan v. Commissioner.8 In Kenan,
appreciated securities were transferred to the beneficiary of a trust in
discharge of a right to receive a specific sum of money. The trust was held
to have realized gain which, in this instance, was a capital gain. The
recognition of this gain to the estate should be anticipated in cases such
as Ewing and Wilson (discussed above) where the claimant is treated as
"purchasing" the property and gets a section 1012 cost basis. This gain
will also increase D.N.I. for the year, which will increase the amount of
income attributable to any distributions to other beneficiaries, during the
year, who receive their property through the operation of the general
distribution rules of sections 661 and 662. The result is the same as if the
estate had sold the appreciated property and used the cash to pay the
claimant.
Another exception to the general rule of nonrecognition upon estate
distributions may arise when section 1245 or 1250 property is distributed.
The effect of D.N.I. upon the section 1245 or 1250 recapture and the
resulting increase in D.N.I. is complex and beyond the scope of this
article, but a thorough exploration of this problem has been provided by
another author. 9
The Service, in Revenue Ruling 55-117,40 has ruled that the distribu-
tion to a beneficiary of a stated percentage of the corpus of a trust will
not create a recognizable gain to the trustee. This type of distribution is
not in satisfaction of an obligation for a definite amount, as in Kenan,
but is actually a partial distribution of a share of the trust principal. If a
will left a percentage of the net estate to each of several beneficiaries, an
agreement among them providing for the distribution of particular assets
to each is not a sale or exchange which requires recognition of gain on
38. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
39. See Freeland, Estate Distributions in Kind, 23 TAx L. REv. 59, 78-84 (1967).
40. 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 233.
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
appreciated property.4' Therefore, it would seem that if the claimant is en-
titled to a share of the estate by intestacy or a percentage as a legatee, a
distribution in settlement of his claim would not be a taxable transaction
to the estate. Thus, if the distribution in compromise of the claim is one
which would create an income tax burden on the estate, the claimant may
have to adjust his demands to compensate for this additional slice out of
the assets remaining for the other beneficiaries. It will probably not be a
major issue, but it is certainly one worth consideration.
M. Sale of Life Interest in Trust
When the settlement agreement establishes a trust and the claimant
receives a life interest in the income, the taxable income of the trust is
passed through to him, as was pointed out in the previous discussion of
subchapter J. However, there still exists the possibility that he will be
able to convert what would ordinarily be ordinary income into capital
gains. Three courts of appeal 42 have held that the sale of the life estate
to the remainderman of the trust represents the sale of a capital asset.
The courts have indicated that such a transaction is not a sale of a naked
right to income but a life interest in trust property. There is a limit on how
far the taxpayer can maneuver in this area, and it seems to be restricted
to the sale of life estates in trust property. In First National Bank v. Com-
missioner,' for example, the taxpayer sold an annuity contract to a bank
and the resulting gain was held to be ordinary income. The contract was
with an insurance company, and the court refused to allow the taxpayer to
convert ordinary income into capital gains in this situation. It appears
that a life interest in property within the trust is a necessary element for
this type of conversion.
A purchase of the life estate by the remainderman appears to allow
the conversion of taxable income into a recovery of capital. In Bell v.
Harrison44 the court held that the remainderman, after such a purchase,
was entitled to recover his cost over the life expectancy of the life bene-
ficiary. The Commissioner's contention, that the merger of the life estate
and the remainder required the remainderman to add the cost to the basis
of the property he received, was rejected by the court. The Service, in
Revenue Ruling 62-132," 5 has indicated that it will follow the Bell v.
Harrison decision. The use of a trust with an income interest in the claim-
ant has the advantage of preserving the principal for the remainderman
and provides advantageous tax treatment to both parties if the remainder-
41. M. L. Long, 35 B.T.A. 95 (1936).
42. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 828 (1947); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 826 (1947) Bell v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
43. 309 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1962).
44. 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954); see also Commissioner v. Fry, 283 F.2d 869 (6th
Cir. 1960).
45. 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 73.
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man accelerates his complete ownership by a purchase of the life estate.
However, it might not be wise for the claimant to plan the sale of the
life estate during the negotiations. If it is obviously a scheme for the
avoidance of taxes the Commissioner is almost sure to attack it.
N. Gift Tax Liability Can Arise out of a Will Contest
The application of Lyeth v. Hoey to gift tax cases was originally
rejected on the grounds that the tax involved in that case was an income
tax.46 Now, however, there is no question that Lyeth is to be considered
when appropriate, regardless of the type of tax involved.4 7 In general, the
gift tax aspects of a will contest or compromise will depend upon the
standing of the claimant under state law, just as Lyeth v. Hoey considered
the right of the claimant to contest according to the law of his jurisdiction.
The major concern in the gift tax area will center around the question of
whether there was in fact a genuine dispute. The object is to prevent what
is actually a gift from escaping taxation under the guise of a will contest.
The Tax Court, in Maud H. Farrell,48 illustrated the court's interest in
the genuineness of the dispute which resulted in the compromise, pointing
out that no taxable gift was made. The court focused upon the fact that
the agreement, which settled the differences between a beneficiary under
the will and a relative not mentioned in the will, was genuine and entered
into at arm's length.
The role of state law in the gift tax area is well illustrated in Hard-
enbergh v. Commissioner." There the decedent died intestate leaving a
widow, daughter and son as sole heirs at law. The widow and daughter had
large estates of their own, and, to equalize the estates, the decedent ar-
ranged to prepare a will leaving the bulk of his estate to the son. He died
before the will was executed, but the wife and daughter relinquished their
rights to the estate which distributed the property according to the de-
cedent's wish. The probate court recognized the renunciations. The court
sustained the Commissioner's contention that the wife and daughter each
made a gift of one-third the net estate. It reasoned that the general rule
as to intestate succession is that title passes according to the rules of state
law. Those who are entitled by law have no power to prevent vesting of
title in themselves in this situation. The rule is different as to legatees or
devisees under a will since they may accept or reject the testamentary gift.
Thus, in Hardenbergh, the wife and daughter held title to the property by
operation of law. The court pointed out that the agreement was not con-
sistent with the state law and that the probate court's award would not
have withstood a direct attack. Only the consent of the taxpayers enabled
46. Houseman v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
656 (1940).
47. See Vaughn, Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Taxes and Compromise Settlements of
Will Contests, 17 BAYLOR L. RaV. 66 (1965).
48. 23 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 280 (1954).
49. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
it to survive. Therefore, the source of the rights acquired by the son was
not that of the probate decree (and thus an inheritance from the decedent)
but the affirmative acts of the taxpayers in relinquishing the shares of the
estate which state law had vested in them. In this case, a taxable gift
resulted since the son had no legitimate claim to the entire estate under
local law.
A gift may also arise from attempts to pass property from the estate
down to the third generation in an attempt to avoid the inclusion of the
property within the estate of the second generation. Lyeth v. Hoey per-
mits property received in settlement of a claim to be received as a result
of the claimant's standing as an heir, legatee or whatever basis he might
have to contest. But, if the prior will or distribution is not actually chal-
lenged, and the agreement is nothing more than a voluntary rearrange-
ment of property interests, the transfers may be considered to have been
made among the beneficiaries rather than from the estate to the beneficiary
who ultimately received the property. Thus, a valid claim under state law
is of utmost importance in order to establish the application of Lyeth v.
Hoey to the agreement.
If the compromise agreement results in the establishment of a trust,
federal tax consequences might often depend upon who is the grantor.
In addition to possible gift treatment, the determination of who is really
the settlor may create future estate tax problems. For example, the court
in Commissioner v. Vease ° determined that the decedent had made a
transfer of property into a trust (with a retained life income interest)
rather than the decedent's father. The purported will challenge and set-
tlement which created the trust from the father's estate was deemed to be
without merit. Thus, the trust property was included in the decedent's
estate since he and not his father was the settlor of the trust. Lyeth v.
Hoey will not authorize a voluntary scheme which will allow property to
bypass an heir's estate where local law affords the parties no legal stand-
ing to dispute the original plan of distribution (whether it be by will or
intestacy).
III. ESTATE TAX CONSmERATIONS
A. The Nature of the Claim Determines the Section 2043 Deduction
The estate and the claimant will be in direct conflict with respect to
the treatment of the compromise payment as a deductible claim against
the estate. The claimant will strive for recognition as an heir or legatee.
As a result the payment would be a nondeductible gift, bequest, or in-
heritance for purposes of the estate tax computation. If the claim satisfies
the section 2053 (c) requirements, that the claim based upon a promise or
agreement is bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration or
money's worth, an estate deduction is available."'
50. 314 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963) ; see also Bailey v. Ratterre, 243 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1957).
51. See Estate of Frederick C. Hodgdon, 21 P-H TAx CT. M=M. 791 (1952).
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The treatment of the compromise by the probate court will often aid
in the classification of the payments as either claims against the estate or
legacies. In Beecher v. United States" the claim was based upon an
agreement before death which grew out of a divorce settlement. The court
discussed the probate court's decree and stressed the fact that it referred
to the claimants as creditors, even though the decedent provided for pay-
ment of the obligation in his will. The deductions were allowed, and the
court pointed out that even if the will had not provided for the payment,
the claimants would have been able to recover from the estate for breach
of contract.
Sometimes, when a compromise payment is made, it must be allocated
between deductible and nondeductible claims. An example of such treat-
ment is found in Hull v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company.53 There the deceased, prior to her death, made claims against
her brother's estate on two grounds: first, that the brother's will was null
and void; and second, that he had defrauded her in connection with the
settlement of her father's estate. The compromise payment, approved by
the court, was paid in a lump sum without being allocated between the two
claims. In the brother's estate tax proceedings, all the data on the settle-
ment was presented to the Internal Revenue Service, which determined
that $134,000 of the $250,000 settlement was attributable to the dece-
dent's claim as a creditor, rather than as an heir taking by intestacy. This
amount was allowed as a deduction for determining estate tax of the
brother's estate. When the decedent died about two years later, this
$134,000 was in her estate, and her representatives claimed that it should
have been included in the brother's estate so that the decedent's estate
would be entitled to a deduction for previously paid taxes. The court,
holding against the taxpayer, said that the administrative determina-
tion of the Service was presumptively correct, absent clear evidence to
the contrary.
It appears that some litigation might be avoided in this area if the
parties to the compromise include in the settlement agreement a promise
by the representatives of the estate not to claim the payments as a section
2053 deduction, when the claim is being settled on the basis of the claim-
ant's assertion of his status as an heir or legatee. If, on the other hand, the
settlement arises out of a claim which should entitle the estate to the deduc-
tion, the claimant should agree that the estate could claim the deduction
and that he would not later assert that he received a tax-free gift, bequest,
or inheritance.
B. The Settlement May Affect the Charitable Deduction
The effect the compromise may have upon the estate's charitable
deduction should be considered during the negotiations. Perhaps the most
common situation will be one in which a non-charitable claimant attacks
52. 280 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960).
53. 177 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1949).
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the decedent's will, as illustrated by Sarge v. Commissioner.14 There the
decedent left the bulk of his estate to charity. The guardian of the in-
competent widow filed a caveat to the probate of the will. The resulting
settlement agreement provided that 2 5 percent of what was to have gone
to the charity would be distributed to the widow. The Commissioner re-
quired the charitable deduction to be reduced by this amount. The court
pointed out that the failure to incorporate the agreement into the probate
proceedings was immaterial. What the widow took in settlement of the
contest she took by inheritance. The modification of the will which arose
as a result of the compromise reduced the share of the charity's bequests
and cut down proportionately the charitable deduction to which the estate
was entitled.
The estate's deduction will be similarly reduced even if agreement is
between the charity and the claimant rather than the estate and the
claimant. In Thompson's Estate v. Commissioner5 the residuary chari-
table legatees gave the claimants $325,000 to withdraw objections to the
decedent's will. The court held that the charitable deduction was reduced
by this amount and additional estate taxes were due. It clearly appears
that the courts will treat the distribution as if it were made by the estate
and will not allow the parties to rely upon a distribution to the charity
to qualify for the full charitable deduction when a later distribution from
the charity to a claimant reduces the amount which the charity ultimately
receives from the decedent. This is clearly in line with Revenue Ruling
145,56 which states that the test for determining the deductible charitable
gifts for the estate will be calculated on the basis of what the charity
actually receives. As indicated in this ruling, however, the rule operates
both ways, and the charitable deduction may be increased in certain cir-
cumstances, often depending upon whether it is the charity or other bene-
ficiaries contesting the will.
When the charity attacks the will offered for probate, the compro-
mise might result in a larger charitable deduction. Whether the payments
to the charity will be deductible by the estate may depend upon the char-
ity's status as a claimant. If it is determined that the charity takes by
bequest or inheritance, under Lyeth v. Hoey the estate is entitled to the
deduction.
In Robbins v. Commissioner5I the charitable deduction was denied
when Amherst College received property under a compromise agreement.
In this case, Amherst was a legatee of a remainder interest, in a very un-
certain amount, under the decedent's will. The court did not allow the
compromise agreement to stand in place of the will for purposes of the
charitable deduction since the deduction would not have been allowed
under the will as it was written. Since the college was not a legatee under
54. 122 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1941).
55. 123 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1941).
56. 1953-2 CuM. BuLL. 273.
57. 111 F.2d 828 (1st Cir. 1940).
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a prior will, it would have received nothing if the will offered for probate
had been void. The court held that the college did not take by bequest or
inheritance under the decedent's will but rather by purchase, and there-
fore no deduction was allowable to the estate for the payment to Amherst.
The estate successfully deducted a compromise payment to charity
in Dumont v. Commissioner."' There the decedent executed two wills, one
in 1938 and a second in 1939. Lafayette College was named the residuary
beneficiary in both wills. The 1939 will was executed less than 30 days
before decedent's death, and by operation of the state law the charitable
bequest was rendered void. The college initiated a will contest which, if
successful, would have permitted it to receive the bequest under the prior
valid will. The property the college received in a settlement was held to be
received by inheritance and not by purchase; therefore, the bequest was
deductible for estate tax purposes as a charitable bequest. In reversing
the Tax Court, the Third Circuit stated that the Tax Court had failed to
consider that Lafayette college occupied the position of a legatee under a
prior will and did not need to rely upon the probated will, under which its
bequest would be void by operation of state law. Therefore the Lyeth v.
Hoey rule applied, and the acquisition was by inheritance. The court
distinguished Robbins because there Amherst College did not have the
status to contest (as did the college in Dumont), since the right of
Amherst as a legatee would have vanished had intestacy been established.
In a more recent case, Back v. McGinnes,"9 the court denied the
application of the Lyeth v. Hoey rationale by holding that the will, as
modified by the compromise settlement, did not convert an otherwise
nondeductible contingent charitable bequest into property received by
the charity as an inheritance, deductible under section 2055(a) (2). In
this case the decedent died testate, leaving the residue of the estate in
trust to his wife for life, the remainder to others, and if the remaindermen
failed to survive the wife, the remainder was to go to charity. The wife
wanted to be sure the charity received some money and elected against
the will, which under Pennsylvania law gave her one half of the estate.
The remaindermen and the charity agreed to a settlement, and the remain-
ing half was distributed between them. The district court rejected the
estate's claim for a charitable deduction on two grounds. First, the char-
itable bequest in the will did not meet the requirements of the Regulations,
section 20.2055-2, since at the date of death it was only a contingent be-
quest, and the possibility that it would not become effective was not so
remote as to be negligible. Second, under Pennsylvania law the widow's
election against the will was equivalent to her death, so that her election
accelerated the remainder interest in the remaindermen, which would
deprive the charity of the legacy. The court said the charity actually
received the property from the other remaindermen and not the testator.
58. 150 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1945).
59. 333 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1964).
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The appellate court affirmed this decision, indicating that under the will
as written the charitable bequest did not qualify for the deduction and
that this failure to qualify is controlling when property is ultimately
distributed. Presumably the remaindermen would be entitled to a char-
itable deduction.
When the charity is to receive property from the residuary estate,
it will be important that the executor be able to support any contention
that claims and expenses were in fact paid out of income. Otherwise, these
distributions may likely be deducted from the gross estate before deter-
mining the residue available for charitable purposes. 60
C. Disclaimers
Section 20.2055-2 (c) of the Regulations indicates that the deduction
for charitable contributions includes any interest which becomes part of
a contribution as a result of a disclaimer by a beneficiary. To effect such
an increased deduction, the disclaimer must be made within 15 months
after the decedent's death or within an extension of time allowed for
filing the estate tax return. If a beneficiary disclaims his interest, which
results in the property passing into the residuary going to charity, the
charitable deduction will include this amount. If, on the other hand, the
property passes to charity not through the will but as a result of a con-
tractual agreement with the beneficiary, the estate will get no charitable
deduction for this portion."'
If a disclaimer is too late, the effect is a gift to the charity by the
beneficiary rather than the estate. 2 However, the mere fact that the
agreement includes a beneficiary's renunciation of his claim to some
property does not automatically create a disclaimer.63
If the amount received by the charity under the settlement of a
will contest would have been received under the will had the contest
continued and the asserted claim been successful, the amount received
under the settlement is received as an inheritance and gives rise to a charit-
able deduction. On the other hand, if no valid gift to the charity is made
by the will, the amount received through the settlement will not provide
the charitable deduction.
D. The Marital Deduction and the Will Contest
The will contest and settlement can alter the amount which would
otherwise qualify for the marital deduction in much the same manner as
it alters the charitable deduction. Section 20.2056(e)-2 (d) of the Regula-
tions specifically states that when the surviving spouse assigns or sur-
60. Estate of Luehrmann v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1961).
61. Rev. Rul. 55-759, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 607.
62. See Drexler, Problem In Gift Tax Returns, N.Y.U. Twenty-third Annual Institute
on Federal Taxation 1169 (1965).
63. Estate of Mary E. Morris, Jr., 35 P-H TAx CT. MEm. 1093 (1966).
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renders a property interest in settlement of a controversy involving the
decedent's will, the interest so assigned or surrendered is not considered
as having passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse. Therefore, it
will not qualify for the marital deduction. Conversely, the Regulations also
provide that if, as a result of the controversy, a property interest is as-
signed or surrendered to the surviving spouse, the interest so acquired will
be regarded as having passed from the decedent to the spouse only if the
assignment or surrender was a bona fide recognition of enforceable rights
of the spouse in the decedent's estate. If the assignment was pursuant to a
decision of a local court upon the merits in an adversary proceeding, the
Regulations state that the required bona fide recognition will be pre-
sumed. However, this rule of the applicability of local law appears to
have been somewhat altered by the recent decision in the Bosch case, dis-
cussed previously. The Bosch rule, which states that federal courts shall
give "proper regard" to local law, does not provide the presumption
which the Regulations here indicate. At any rate, the Regulations go on
to indicate that if the assignment or surrender was pursuant to a consent
decree, or pursuant to an agreement not to contest or probate the will, it
will not necessarily be accepted as a bona fide evaluation of this right of
the spouse. Since Bosch, this is a more accurate statement of the law with
respect to will contests than the adversary proceeding test. The courts
will consider the merits of the claim asserted, giving the proper regard to
the local law, in evaluating the rights of the spouse out of which the settle-
ment arose.
Section 20.2056(e)-2(c) of the Regulations indicates that the prop-
erty received by a surviving spouse who renounces the will and takes
dower can qualify for the marital deduction. The Service, in Revenue
Ruling 66-139,14 states that the settlement payment made by the executor
of the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse, in compromise of a claim
made by her for an absolute dower interest under state law, following
arms length negotiations, qualifies for the marital deduction. The spouse
had signed an antenuptial agreement in which she renounced present and
future rights in the decedent's estate. Relying upon this agreement, which
the spouse claimed was invalid, the executor denied the dower claim. Fol-
lowing the rationale of Lyeth v. Hoey, the amount paid to the surviving
spouse pursuant to this bona fide compromise agreement qualified for the
marital deduction to the extent the interest which would have passed to
her as a result of the completed exercise of her rights would have been
deductible.
The requirement that the compromise payment be in bona fide recog-
nition of an enforceable right of the surviving spouse is also illustrated in
Estate of Morris Menkus. 5 There the decedent established five inter vivos
trusts with the bulk of his assets. He retained a life interest in three of
64. 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 225.
65. 31 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 619 (1962).
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these trusts which was sufficient to include them in his taxable estate. He
left his wife nothing, and his probate estate was very small. The surviving
spouse filed a caveat against the probate of the decedent's will, and the
dispute was settled by the payment to her of $6,000. This amount was
actually in excess of the probate estate. The court pointed out that the
most the spouse would have received under state law, if the will attack had
been successful, was about $1,500 due to the small probate estate and
the lack of any interest passing to her in the trusts. The estate was un-
successful in its attempt to qualify the $6,000 settlement for the marital
deduction since at least part of it was for something other than her claim
as an heir. Part of the payment, for example, was probably to get her to
agree to join in a joint return for the decedent's last income tax return. The
court held that the petitioner failed to prove what part, if any, of the pay-
ment to the widow was a bona fide recognition of her claim as an heir,
which was necessary to qualify as an interest passing from the decedent
for the purpose of the marital deduction.
When facing a similar situation, the parties to the dispute should
consider an allocation of the payment among the claims asserted, and
such allocation should be included in the compromise agreement. This
incorporation of the allocation within the agreement will, without more,
probably not be sufficient to sustain the taxpayer's burden of proof. It
will, however, offer some evidence in support of the deduction.
An interesting application of the will contest as a tax-saving device is
illustrated in the case of Isaac Harter, Jr.66 There, the decedent willed her
entire estate to her son. The decedent's husband elected against the will
to share in her estate by intestacy pursuant to state law. On the same day
the husband received his intestate share he gave it to the son's three chil-
dren. The gift tax on this transfer was less than the amount of estate tax
saved by obtaining the marital deduction for the estate. The Commis-
sioner, in disallowing the marital deduction, said the gift to the children
made the husband's election a nullity. In holding for the estate and allow-
ing the marital deduction, the court found that the proper election was in
fact made and that the ultimate disposition was actually different from
that provided in the will. The court made no decision as to the result if
the husband had given the property to his son (so that the ultimate dis-
position was the same as the will directed) rather than to his grandchil-
dren. Therefore, in spite of the Commissioner's acquiescence in this
decision, it may not be advisable for the surviving spouse to immediately
transfer the property, received as a result of the election, to beneficiaries
named in the will.6 7 Of course, the transaction will be doomed from the
beginning if there existed a contractual agreement with the surviving
spouse to transfer the property to others. In this situation the spouse's
66. 39 T.C. 511 (1962).
67. 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 4.
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interest in the property would be regarded as a terminable interest which
would not qualify for the marital deduction.
E. Payment of Estate Tax
Section 2002 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the estate
tax shall be paid by the executor. Beyond this, the manner in which the
tax burden is distributed is left to local law; therefore, the effect of the
payment of the tax upon the beneficiaries will vary in different jurisdic-
tions. There will often arise a question as to the effect of a contest or
compromise upon the payment of both the federal estate tax and state
inheritance taxes. A detailed discussion of the varying application of the
local law in each state is beyond the scope of this article. However, a few
examples should be mentioned in order to point out the widely differing
results in various jurisdictions.
Local law may provide that death costs are to be paid out of the
residuary estate, unless the decedent expresses a different intent. Other
states have adopted acts which apportion the tax among the various items
which contribute to the tax. The terms of the apportionment act or other
applicable local law must be examined to determine the distribution of
the tax load when there has been a compromise under which the assets
are not distributed according to the will. The solution may depend upon
whether the state law regards the property as passing to the takers under
the will and then to the claimants, or as passing directly to the takers
under the compromise.
In Pulliam v. Thrash"8 a North Carolina court held that an inheri-
tance tax was properly assessed against the three devisees named in the
will even though the property was divided among four people as a result
of a compromise agreement. On the other hand, a Maryland court in
Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co. 9 applied the state inheritance tax as though
the will had given the property initially to those who took under the
compromise agreement. These cases indicate the lack of conformity in
local law with respect to the apportionment of certain taxes upon the
compromise of a will contest. The parties to a dispute must consult the
law in their own jurisdiction to determine the net result of any proposed
settlement.
IV. COMPROMISE AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
A. Special Statute of Limitations Considerations
Obviously, consideration of the statutes of limitations is not restricted
to circumstances involving a compromise after the distribution of estate
assets. However, the compromise after distribution is more likely to be
68. 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957) ; see also Hasting v. Unander, 224 Ore. 165, 355
P.2d 738 (1960).
69. 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1941).
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affected by the statute of limitations than the compromise before distribu-
tion simply because it is more likely to occur near the end or after the
period of limitations has run.
For income tax purposes, the use of section 1311 for making adjust-
ments in closed years will be rather limited when adjustments are required
by the compromise. The circumstances of adjustment defined in section
1312(5) will provide for the proper adjustments between the estate or
trust and the beneficiaries, heirs, and legatees. However, no provision
seems to be available to reopen closed years when the adjustment is be-
tween two beneficiaries since the claimant and the beneficiary will not
fall within any of the groups of related taxpayers in section 1313(c).
Therefore, the beneficiary will normally have to rely upon other means
of adjustment, such as the claim of right doctrine which is discussed later
in this article.
B. Statute of Limitations on Assessments
The parties to the compromise should also be aware of the statute
of limitations with respect to assessments and filing claims for refunds.
This could be especially important if the compromise will result in an
increase or reduction of either the marital or charitable deductions. The
basic provision of limitations on assessments, found in section 6501, pro-
vides for assessment within three years after the return is filed, or from
the last day allowed for filing if an early return is filed. This three-year
period is extended to six years if the taxpayer omits from the gross estate
items which exceed 25 percent of the gross estate stated on the return.
This possibility of newly discovered assets extending the normal three
year period of limitations will probably not be encountered too often, but
the persons upon whom state law places the burden of the additional taxes
should be aware of the consequences. Section 6501 (c) (4) provides for an
agreement to extend the period for assessment, but it specifically excludes
estate taxes from its coverage. The running of the statute of limitations
will be suspended by section 6503 if a 90-day letter is mailed during the
period in which the Secretary is prohibited from making an assessment,
and for 60 days thereafter. Therefore, a timely mailing of a 90-day letter
will give the Commissioner additional time to assess a deficiency. Thus,
if the compromise results in a reduction of estate deductions, the parties
must be prepared to pay an additional assessment within the statutory
period.
Section 2016 provides an important exception to the section 6501
period of limitations on assessment. If the executor or any other person
recovers any state or foreign death taxes which were claimed as credits
under sections 2011 or 2014, he must notify the Commissioner. Any fed-
eral estate tax found to be due as a result of the refund is payable by
the person or persons receiving it upon notice and demand, even though
FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF WILL CONTESTS
the refund is received after expiration of the period of limitations set
forth in section 6501.
C. Statute of Limitations on Claims for Refund
If, on the other hand, the compromise would result in a reduction
of estate taxes due to an increase in the marital or charitable deduction,
the limitations on the period for filing a claim for refunds will be impor-
tant if the estate tax has already been paid. In general, section 6511 re-
quires a claim for refund to be filed within three years from the date the
return was filed or two years from the time the tax is paid, whichever is
later. If the claim for refund is disallowed, section 6532 (a) requires that
suit be filed within two years of the date of the disallowance. The Su-
preme Court, in Flora v. United States °7 0 held that full payment of the
tax assessed is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for refund. This
decision appears to place the taxpayer in a difficult position if the tax
has not yet been fully paid, because of an election to pay a part of the
tax over a ten-year period, as provided by sections 6161 or 6166. If the
taxpayer waits ten years, until the tax is paid, it will be too late to file
a claim for refund under section 6511. If he files a timely claim for re-
fund, which the Commissioner denies, the two-year period for filing a suit
for refund provided by section 6532(a) will expire before the total tax
is paid, since Flora requires full payment as a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
It appears that the taxpayer in this situation is faced with the possibility
of losing a refund to which he is righfully entitled if he is not able
to pay the full amount of tax originally due. There seems to be no statu-
tory provision which permits him to ignore the Flora rule and sue before
full payment is made. It may be possible for the taxpayer to file a timely
protective claim for refund and request the Internal Revenue Service to
postpone action upon it until the tax has been paid, since the two-year
period of section 6532 (a) begins when the claim is disallowed. Postpone-
ment of the disallowance would enable the taxpayer to pay during the
extended period available. Section 6532(a)(2) provides for a written
extension of the two-year period for filing suit, and in this situation the
Secretary should agree. Since the Code itself contemplates the payment
of estate taxes over a period of years, this alone might justify an excep-
tion to the Flora rule if the Commissioner refuses to extend the time for
filing suit. However, there is not yet any authority for such an exception.
D. The Tax Effect in General
The parties cannot be certain how the status of the claim and the terms
of the compromise will affect the tax consequences of a compromise agree-
ment when the payment is made by the distributees, rather than the
estate. Will the principle of Lyeth v. Hoey be as applicable to a com-
70. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
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promise after the distribution of assets by the estate as it would be prior
to such distribution? If a settlement would have been considered a section
102 (b) bequest or gift of income if distributed by the estate, perhaps
the same characterization should attach to the settlement after distribu-
tion. If the claimant receives a payment from a beneficiary which the
agreement characterizes as part principal and part income there is justi-
fication for taxing him on that basis. However, the taxpayers must re-
member that many times the courts have expressed a willingness to look
beyond the wording of an agreement, ignoring the formalism, in order to
determine what really occurred in the transaction and tax the parties
accordingly. For example, if the compromise is actually a scheme to dis-
guise an assignment of income the agreement might properly be ignored.
Even if the agreement calls for the payment of a lump sum, without
any attempt to characterize the property transferred, the proper tax treat-
ment is not always clear. If the estate is terminated there can be no cur-
rent D.N.I. to create taxable income upon receipt. But what regard should
be given to previous D.N.I. which may have been allocated to the property
upon its initial distribution from the estate to the beneficiary now giving
up the property? An example of this problem might be illustrated as fol-
lows: beneficiary A received property from the estate worth $100 at a
time when $50 of D.N.I. was allocated to the distribution. A would pay
a tax on $50 of income. Suppose now, claimant C appears and asserts a
claim to the property, and this claim is successfully litigated in court.
What tax effect would the transfer of the property have on A and C?
Should C be permitted to claim the entire $100 value of the property
received as a tax exempt bequest since it was received in a lump sum
award and there was no D.N.I. present at the time? Clearly, he would
have had $50 of taxable income if he had received the property from the
estate if it had been originally distributed to him instead of A. Beneficiary
A would have paid the tax on $50 upon receipt of the property which he
no longer has, thus he should be entitled to an adjustment. If after an
adjustment for A, claimant C is permitted to receive the property tax free
the $50 of D.N.I. allocable to the property would escape taxation. On
the other hand, it might be argued that the first error, which resulted
from the improper distribution to A, does not justify a second erroneous
application of the statute in an attempt to rectify the original mistake.
Would it be an unreasonable extension of Lyeth v. Hoey to deem
the receipt of the property to relate back to the will, or if the decedent
died intestate back to the date of death or original distribution from the
estate? If this idea was applied to the above example we could reasonably
maintain that the D.N.I. which followed the property to beneficiary A
would be allocated to the claimant as if he had received the property
by distribution from the estate. Thus, there would be no income escaping
taxation, and if accompanied by a proper adjustment to A for the taxes
he had paid, the parties would be placed in essentially the same position
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they would have been had the proper distribution been made in the first
place. Some support for the relation back principle in general is illustrated
in Emanuelson v. United States.1 There, a dispute between charitable
and non-charitable legatees was settled in 1950. The compromise gave
the charities a portion of the estate and its income for the years 1949 and
1950. The Commissioner denied the estate a charitable deduction for the
1949 income which went to the charity under the 1950 agreement. He
asserted that this income could not qualify under the statute as "paid or
permanently set aside" for charitable purposes "during the tax year.""2
The government said that the charitable disposition must have been oper-
ative at the time the income occurred and the "paid or permanently set
aside" feature must have been currently applicable. The court allowed
the deduction for the 1949 income, holding that the compromise agree-
ment relates back to the time of probate of the will. To treat it otherwise
would ignore the principle that the compromise agreement takes the place
of the will.
Even the relation back idea would not always provide a satisfactory
adjustment in all situations. For example, the compromise might result
in a distribution of property which would have altered the amount of
the marital or charitable deductions allowable for estate tax purposes
had the conflict been settled before the statute of limitations on assess-
ment or claim for refund of estate taxes had run. There is no authority
available which would authorize the reopening of the closed years in this
situation. However, the relation back principle could still be useful in real-
locating the burden of the payment of the taxes among the beneficiaries,
conforming with the redistribution of the property as a result of the com-
promise.
E. Adjustment for Original Distributees
The beneficiaries giving up the property will usually be entitled to
some income tax relief as a result of the compromise. The Regulations
for subchapter J, when discussing the operation of the second tier distribu-
tions, use the word "properly" distributed to a beneficiary, without any
mention of the result when a distribution is improperly made. (Such as
when the executor distributes to one beneficiary more than his share of
the estate.) It appears that such a distribution would be outside subchapter
J and would not be included in the second tier computation of the bene-
ficiaries' taxes. The fact that such distribution was improper may not be
known until the claim is asserted. In these cases, it appears that the bene-
ficiaries giving up the property may use the "claim of right doctrine" to
obtain an adjustment in the year of payment." The adjustment would
provide a deduction to offset the income he was required to include in the
71. 159 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1958).
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939 § 162(a), now found in § 642(c) of the 1954 CODE.
73. Martin R. Bowen, 34 T.C. 222 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1961).
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earlier year. If the beneficiary meets the statutory requirements of section
1341, the alternative relief provisions of that statutory claim of right
section are available.74 Since the claim of right allows the adjustment in
the year of repayment, the beneficiary may want to go back and file
amended returns, if the year of erroneous inclusion of income is not closed
by the statute of limitations. If the beneficiary must rely upon the claim
of right doctrine for relief because the statute of limitations prevents an
amended return, the deduction allowable in the year of payment could
be lost if the beneficiary had no income in the year of repayment against
which the deduction would apply.
75
F. Section 642(h) Deductions
If the recovery of the claimant relates back to provide him a portion
of any section 642 (h) deductions which were allowed to the beneficiary
in the year the estate was terminated, the tax adjustments may not be
balanced. If the claimant is allowed the benefit of his share of the section
642 (h) excess deductions, the Commissioner should be able to go back
and assert a deficiency against the original beneficiary who claimed the
deductions, if the tax year involved is still open. As a result of the two ad-
justments, both the claimant and the original recipient of the property
are placed in approximately the same position as they would have been
had the proper distribution been made in the first place. If the statute of
limitations has closed the year, it appears doubtful that the tax benefit
doctrine within section 111 should be available to the Commissioner. The
reallocation of the excess deductions in a will compromise does not fit
within the definition of a recovery of bad debts, prior taxes, or delinquency
amounts. Section 1.111-(a), of the Regulations, applies the tax benefit
rules of this section to all "losses, expenditures, and accruals" which were
deducted in earlier years. Whether an extension of the section 111 lan-
guage would apply to tax the original beneficiary on the benefit he re-
ceived by claiming a deduction to which he is not entitled is not clear. At
least one case, Streckfus Steamers, Inc.76 held that the tax benefit doc-
trine of section 111 applied only to recovery of a deduction properly
allowed. While this case did not involve a will contest, it may indicate
that a section 642 (h) deduction which was improperly taken would not
enable the Commissioner to later include the tax benefit received in the
beneficiary's income. If this is the case, the relation back principle would
seem to permit a double section 642 (h) deduction when the settlement
occurs after the statute of limitations for assessment has run on the orig-
inal beneficiary's year of deduction. This is certainly not the result which
the relation back idea is designed to provide. It might be suggested, how-
74. See also Berarducci, Repayment of Claim of Right Income By an Estate Under
Section 1341, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 56 (1964).
75. Phillips v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1959).
76. 19 T.C. 1 (1952),
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ever, that with a tax structure as complex as ours it would be almost im-
possible to eliminate every loophole or inequity.
The Commissioner will also not be able to rely upon section 6501 (e)
(1) to extend the statute of limitations on assessment from three to six
years, since this section operates only when there has been an omission
from gross income, and deductions may be overstated in any amount
without incurring the extension provided by the statute. This area of the
law is not yet well developed with respect to will contests. Section 642 (h)
was not added to the Code until 1954, and there are no cases which deal
with the adjustment of taxes in this situation.
V. EXECUTOR'S AND TRANSFEREE'S LIABILITY
The executor should be aware of the extent of his personal liability
for the payment of taxes, especially if the compromise is one which will
result in additional taxes to the estate. 7 Section 6901 (a) (1) (B) refers
to 31 U.S.C., section 192 for the determination of the fiduciaries' liability.
Under section 192, an executor who pays the decedent's other debts be-
fore he satisfies the debts due the United States from such person or estate
shall become answerable in his own person to the extent of such payments
for the debts due the United States, or for the amount which remains un-
paid. Section 20.2002-1 of the Regulations, which discusses 31 U.S.C.,
section 192, indicates that the word "debt" includes a beneficiary's dis-
tributive share of the estate. If the executor is not certain that he will
retain enough property after a distribution to pay the taxes due, he should
protect himself by requiring the distributees to furnish a bond with surety.
This liability aDplies only if the fiduciary has personal knowledge of the
unpaid tax liability or possesses such knowledge as would put a reasonable
man on inquiry78 The executor in a will compromise would certainly be
put on notice of the possible tax consequences to the estate which would
arise as a result of the compromise.
The discharge of the executor by the probate court does not terminate
his liability. If he is subjected to personal liability as a result of a dis-
tribution, he may compel reimbursement from the distributees. The
executor may wish to take advantage of section 6501 (d) to shorten the
assessment and collection period. The effect of the request for prompt
assessment, as provided by this section, is to require the assessment of
any tax or proceeding in court without assessment, to be begun within
eighteen months from the date the request is received. This will not oper-
ate to give the Commissioner more than the normal three-year period for
assessment. It is important to note, however, that in the case of the li-
ability of a fiduciary, section 6901 (c) (4) provides that the period of
limitation extends for one year after the liability arises, or after the ex-
77. See Cohen, Transferee Liability Under The Internal Revenue Code, 10 TAX CoUN.
Q. 247 (1966).
78. Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 Cum. BuLL. 291.
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piration of the period for the collection of the tax, whichever is the later.
Thus the executor's liability could extend beyond the period of limitations
on assessment against the estate.
Section 6901 also deals with the claimant's liability as a transferee.
In the case of a transferee, assessment must be made within one year
after expiration of the period of limitation for assessment against the
transferor. If the estate's inability to pay the taxes due arises out of the
personal representative's failure to observe the proper priority of pay-
ment, the Commissioner has the election to go against the fiduciary under
31 U.S.C., section 192, or against the beneficiary under section 6901, or
he may invoke both remedies if necessary to collect the tax.
If the contest and compromise arise after the section 2204 discharge
of the executor, he is protected from further claims which may arise as
a result of the settlement. However, the claimant and other beneficiaries
will not be relieved of liability, and the Commissioner can still assess a
deficiency against them within the statutory period.
VI. TREATMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES ARISING
OUT OF THE CONTEST
A. The Claimant-Beneficiaries
The nature of the claim upon which the compromise is based will
probably be the most important factor in determining the availability of
a section 212 deduction for attorney's fees. Generally, if the property
received in compromise is characterized as income, a deduction will be
allowed for the expenses incurred for the production or collection of in-
come. On the other hand, expenses incurred in obtaining a section 102 (a)
tax-exempt bequest or inheritance will not be deductible. It would seem
to make no difference whether the dispute involved an outside claimant or
was merely a disagreement among beneficiaries named in the will. The
Commissioner will certainly contend such expenses were incurred in de-
fending or perfecting one's title to property and thus are not allowable
as a deduction. If the expenses arise out of an attempt to acquire an in-
heritance under the laws of intestate succession, they are considered
capital in nature and are not deductible.7 9 The same results should follow
from attempts to acquire property as a legatee under a prior will or as the
dower interest of a surviving spouse.
It is not always easy to decide when a court will determine an ex-
pense as one which is to perfect title to property (and not deductible) or
an expense of conservation of property held for income (thus deductible).
The cases are decided upon factual questions, and no clear distinction can
be drawn beyond the fact situations in each case."0 If the claimant incurs
79. Bliss v. United States, 373 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
80. See generally E. W. Brown, Jr., 19 T.C. 87 (1952), aff'd, 215 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1954);
Garrett v. Crenshaw, 196 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Frederich Rowe, 24 T.C. 382 (1955).
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expenses in obtaining title to income-producing property, the expenses
are still capital in nature and are not deductible as cost incurred for the
production of income, nor for the conservation of income-producing prop-
erty, since he did not have prior title to the property.81
When the claimant is entitled to a deduction for expenses incurred,
often he will not be able to obtain full benefit of the deduction. In Walter
F. O'Brien,82 the taxpayer filed a claim for recovery of salary. He received
$16,000 and paid his attorney one half. He was required to treat the entire
$16,000 as back pay and used section 1301 to spread back the income. The
court denied his attempt to spread back the attorney's fees and held that
they must be deducted in full in the year they were paid. The court
agreed with the equity of the taxpayer's position but pointed out there
is no provision for spreading back the related expenses. The court also
denied his claim that he should only include $8,000 in income since this
is what he actually received. In holding that the full amount was includ-
able, the court stressed the state law which appeared to give the attorney
no claim on the judgement. Thus, with income of less than $8,000 in the
year of recovery, the excess deduction above the available income was lost.
This case did not involve a will contest, but it clearly illustrates the type
of problem which might arise.
In Cotnam v. Commissioner,3 the court relied upon local law to ex-
clude the attorney's fee from the claimant's income. There a contingent
fee arrangement, under Alabama law, gave the attorney a right to the fee
in the manner of an assignment of a portion of the claim. With regard to
this portion of the recovery, the attorney had the same rights as the
client, and the taxpayer could not have gotten this amount. Thus the at-
torney's portion of the recovery (his contingent fee) was not included in
the claimant's income. This application solves the bunching of deductions
problem which was present in the O'Brien case.
The Tax Court has not followed the Fifth Circuit in Cotnam and
distinguishes the case on its facts. It continues to follow O'Brien in re-
quiring the entire recovery to be included in income. 4 In Walter Peter-
sen,85 another contingent fee case, the Tax Court distinguished Cotnam
on the basis of local law and held that the attorney's fees were not a
reduction of the amount received by the taxpayer. In Petersen, even
though the Nebraska attorney has a lien upon the money in the hands
of an adverse party, such provisions differed from Alabama law in that
they do not provide the attorney with the same power over suit and judg-
ments as his client has. It seems that the Tax Court needs only a small
variance from the Alabama law to distinguish Cotnam.
81. James W. Hofstead, 31 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1405 (1962).
82. 38 T.C. 707 (1962).
83. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
84. T. Michael Smith, 36 P-H TAx CT. MM. 1116 (1967).
85. 38 T.C. 137 (1962).
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B. The Estate's Expenses
Administrative expenses allowable under state law will constitute an
estate deduction under section 2053. This statutory reliance upon state
law makes it easier for the estate to deduct attorney's fees, especially
when the expenses are approved by the local probate court. In Sussman v.
United States,8 for example, the daughter contested her father's will and,
in compromise, received one-half the residue of the estate. The agree-
ment also provided that her attorney's fees were to be paid by the estate.
The probate court allowed the payment as an administrative expense.
The court held that since the state law was not clearly contrary to the
probate court's holding, the deduction should be allowed.
Section 20.2053-3(c) (3) of the Regulations indicates that the at-
torney's fees incurred by beneficiaries, incident to litigation as to their
respective interests, do not constitute proper deductions, inasmuch as
these expenses are incurred on behalf of the beneficiaries personally. The
holding in the Sussman case seems directly contrary to this regulation,
but the fact that the probate court approved the payment seems suffi-
cient to make the expense deductible. It seems, therefore, that it would
be wise to seek the court's approval of the compromise agreement and
expenses paid by the estate thereunder. As costs of administration under
local law, such expenses are clearly deductible. 7
VII. CONCLUSION
The application of Lyeth v. Hoey will characterize a claim and com-
promise settlement. This characterization, and the relation back principle,
are determinative factors in ascertaining the resulting tax consequences.
Both the claimant and the estate must consider the entire range of tax
considerations in order to negotiate most effectively, and the application
of state law in the federal courts should be considered. The ultimate appli-
cation of the federal tax laws to the compromise may not be clearly pre-
dictable in each individual instance, but the general rules which have been
established should provide the parties an adequate framework within
which to operate.
86. 236 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
87. See Estate of Minnie S. Pridemore, 30 P-H TAX CT. MEm. 59 (1961).
